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Between A Rock And A Hard Place:
Argentina in the Second World War

By Joshua M. Hannan

The history of World War !l is usually written in terms of the Axis
powers of Germany, Japan, and ltaly versus the Allied forces of the United
States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain. While this is the most obvious
approach to the subject, it leaves out essential elements of the events
surrounding the war. While World War ll is often referred to as the "Good
War" by those who view it as a conflict of ideologies, it has its roots in a
more basic struggle, a struggle for economic and political power. lt is
within that struggle that we find the complex relationships that Argentina
held with Germany, Great Britain, and most importantly, the United States.

ln the years leading up to the war Argentina had begun to position
itself within the international community. A budding world power, Argentina

saw the war not as a battle of ideologies but as an economic and political

opportunity. Unfortunately, for Argentina, somewhere in the strange web of
international politics, they upset the balance of power and despite a shortterm economic windfall, came up short.
Delving into the various, sometimes complex, issues surrounding

Argentina in the period leading up to, during and after World War ll can be
confusing. Before doing So, one should have a general understanding of
the events that lead up to this point, as well as an idea of what was at

stake. While the focus of this paper is on the events surrounding the war
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and its outcome, the events leading up to it are possibly the most
important.

The League of Nations had been formed, however, the United States
Congress was preventing its nation from joining. Argentina saw this as an
opportunity to work within the world community to displace the United
States in the Western Hemisphere. A dispute between Paraguay and
Bolivia created the perfect testing ground for this new challenge. The
United States and Argentina were both interested in heading the peace
negotiations between the two belligerent nations. The United States allied
itself with Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, and Uruguay while Argentina created a
group comprised of itself , Brazil, Chile, and Peru (ABCP). Because the
members of ABCP were also border states, Argentina started with the
upper hand. This was a position that they would be successful in holding.
From a position of newly gained power, Argentina took full
advantage of the United States vulnerability. During negotiations with the
League of Nations Argentina was able to distinguish itself from the PanAmerican countries by stating, "the Monroe Doctrine...is a unilateral
declaration, which in its time lent distinguished service to the cause of

American emancipation, but which does not constitute a regional

J

agreement as the mentioned article expresses it."1 After releasing
themselves from some of the political strings of the United States,
Argentina took it a step further. Using its strength within the international

community-in the form of Woodrow Wilson's League of NationsArgentina challenged the United States legitimacy to negotiate the dispute.
Moreover, although tensions between the two countries would continue for
many years, Argentina had scored the first victory
Despite these early antagonistic beginnings with the United States,
Argentina actually chose the position of neutrality at the beginning of World

War

ll.

This initially conformed to the United States policy and Argentina's

neutrality was confirmed in Panama (1939) where the First Meeting of
Consultation of the American Foreign Ministers was held. The conferences
leadership group was that of the Pan American Union (a group that
Argentina would later come to ignore). lt was in these meetings that a
hemispheric resolve was met. At the center of this resolve were three
guiding principles: "neutrality, protection of peace in the hemisphere, and
economic cooperation to ameliorate the effects of the war on the
economies of the American countries."2

'Alberto ConilPaz and Gustavo Ferrari, Arqentina's Foreion Policv, 1930-1962, trans. John L.
Kennedy,
Notre Dame, London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966.
2lbid. pp. 51
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The resolve of the conference was quickly tested. Dr. Leopoldo
Melo, the head of the Argentine delegation, had predicted trouble. When

the British-German naval conflict off the coast of neighboring Uruguay
ended in the sinking of the German cruiser, Graf Spee, it came as no

surprise. Because Argentine officials had suspected that an event would
challenge the resolve of the conference, they began to question how the
coalition would proceed. When no response came, a split soon followed
This would come to be seen as a turning point for Argentine leadership,
who set out to redefine the uniform neutrality of which they were a part3.
They did not find an ally in the United States although questions remain as
to whether the Argentine policy was, in reality, a split from United States
policy
A festering split between the United States and Argentina made itself
evident at the Second Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American
Countries in Havana, 1940. Dr. Mello and Cordell Hul!, the moralistic U.S

3 Argentine neutrality is sometimes referred to, as a concept called "non-belligerency". lt has
been described as, "a status somewhere between belligerency and neutrality and more a political
concept than a legal one. The essence of non-belligerency, as it was pursued in World War ll, is
the favoring of one of the belligerent states or coalitions in a war to the extent of rendering
economic and other support while at the same time continuing to enjoy the rights of neutrality.
lnternational legalexperts (as of 1998) agree that non-belligerency is not an accepted status
under international law."
Postwar Relations and
Source: U.S. Department of State U.S. and Allied Wartime
Turkev
on Looted Gold and German
Sweden,
and
Portuqal.
Spain.
Neootiations with Arqentina,
Ustasha Treasurv.
Fate
the
Wartime
About
the
of
External Assets and U.S. Concerns
pp. xxxiii
1998.
Printing
Office,
Washington D.C.: United States Government
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Secretary of State spent most of the conference at odds with each other
This was a continuation of a division that started in Buenos Aires (1936)

when Hull claimed credit for the developing the "meetings of American
foreign ministers...to deal with emergencies," that had been suggested by
the Argentine delegation, without giving them recognition.a This was in
stark contrast to the early beginnings of their relationship that had started
with the two men both politically and socially friendly with each other.
Unfortunately, the animosity between Hull and Argentina would grow,
consuming U.S. foreign policy towards Argentina and strengthening

Argentine resolve against the monster of the North.
Just as with the overlying issue, the views of Secretary of State

Cordell Hull are complex and full of dispute. Hul! was seen as "a Southern
Puritan, who believed in citing the Old Testament and the War of
Secession as means of solving contemporary problems" by the Argentine

diplomats.s He was not viewed much better in his own country where it
was suggested that Argentina was given to him as a "play toy.6 Historian
Warren Kimball asserts that "Hull must not be dismissed as an

4

Arthur P. \A/hitaker, The United States and Arqentina, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
Universi$ Press, 195a. pp. 109
5
Paz, Alberto Coniland Gustavo Ferrari. Arqentina's Foreiqn Policv 1930-1962. Notre Dame,
lndiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966. pp. 33
6
Warren F. Kimball, Roosevelt and Anqlo-American Competition in Latin America from Arqentina
Between Great Powers, 1939-46, pp.27
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unimportant, uninfluential foreign policy figure."7 Kimball's assertions are
correct because there is no other figure in United States-Argentine
relations at the time that had a greater impact

While his impact was big, it was not a positive one. Hull felt that all
American countries should have stepped up right away and unified against
the Axis. Even in his capacity as Secretary of State, Hull was undercut by

the Undersecretary Sumner Welles. Welles was the President's friend and
the architect of the Good Neighbor Policy. He and Hull were opposites

from day one, and on many occasions Welles would simply bypass the
chain of command and go directly to F.D.R. For Welles this was a
necessity because Hull disregarded what he considered valid information
and would not work with other departments unless it served his needs
This created a situation in which Hull found it necessary to prove himself to
Roosevelt with the hopes that he would join the president's inner circle.
This dispute, while it did not always revolve around Argentina, would end
with the resignation of Welles in 1943, eliminating one of the biggest
checks on Hull's moral assault of Argentina. Hull's approach, had it been
successful, would have resulted in a blue print for dealing with Latin
American countries. lnstead, the results were far from what had been
desired.
7

tbid. pp.27
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Hull had known that the Ramirez presidency was in jeopardy.
Ramirez had asked for United States intelligence materials on his rivals.
Knowing that the materials would essentially seal a pact between the
Argentine government and the United States, Hull refused the request. As
Randall B. Woods suggests, "lronically, the Secretary of State contributed
to the fall of a government he had already brought under his control, and in
so doing provided the opportunity for Colonel Peron...to seize power."8
One possible explanation for this move was that when Peron came
on the scene as a member of the Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (GOU), the
U.S. initially thought they had an ally. lnstead what they got was a

politician. Peron was someone who knew the value of political wheeling
and dealing. He knew that by getting on the good side of the United States
he would be able to benefit his countU, as well as himself. While Peron

was aware the benefits of a political alliance with the United States were
positive, nevertheless, he was (at least publicly) upset by the interventionist
policies that were a reality despite the Good Neighbor Policy. Partially due
to this, he placed Argentina in the philosophical, " "Third Position" between
capitalism and communism."e Although he believed this ideologically, he
did not practice it economically. At first, it was his ability to separate the
Woods, Randall B. "Hulland Argentina: Wilsonian Diplomacy in the Age of
Roosevelt." Journal of lnter-Ameican Studies and World Affairs 1974 16(3): 350-371

8
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ideology from the economy that kept him in a position of power both at
home and abroad

A number of sources suggest that the relationship between the
United States and Argentina had less to do with Cordell Hull's animosity
toward Argentina and more to do with economic and politica! challenges to

the United States. These challenges led to a United States approach that
tried to create a politically friendly environment in Argentina. This was
despite the Good Neighbor policy's supposed anti-interventionist premises
ln the end, Argentina needed little help in destroying its economy. After all,

"in 1940 Argentina had a per capita income and a degree of social
development which placed her among the most'advanced' countries in the

world. By 1970 she was already a well-established member of the third
world."lo Although, it is unlikely that this could be accomplished without an
outside influence.

The United States initiated its interventionist activities by leaking
diplomatic information to the Argentine press. ln addition, the Argentine
papers found themselves as the grounds for a propaganda battle between

the United States and Germany, both of which funneled financial support in
exchange for propaganda. The influence of both the United States and
e

Arthur P. \A/hitaker, The United States and Arqentina, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1954), pp 65
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Germany lead to an increased destabilization of the already unstable
political parties. This was in part due to party ties to the newspapers,

which created images of party influence from abroad. This was much more
of a problem for the pro-American papers as it was fuel for the anti-

American cause.11
From there, an economic boycott began. Between the years of 1942

and 1949 the U.S. refused license to export, "steel machinery, railway
replacement parts and rolling stock, petroleum equipment and chemicals,
iron and steel, coal, fuel oil, caustic soda and ash, tinplate, etc., to afar
greater extent than was justified by wartime scarcities, ahd with the
intention of increasing Argentina's vulnerability, for which purpose studies

were undertaken by U.S. government officials.'12 While these statistics
may be questioned as unimportant because of the strength of Argentina's
economic ties with Europe, they become more relevant in light of the
enormous shift in North American reliance before the war.13 This situation
Carlos Escude, US Political Destabilization and Economic Bovcott of Arqentina durinq the
1940's from Arqentina Between Great Powers, 1939-46, pp. 56
ii Mario Rapoport, Foreion and Domestic Policv in Arqentina durinq the Second World War: The
Traditional Political Paries and the Militarv Reqime. 1943-45 from Arqentina Between the Great
10

Powers, 193946, pp. 93-94
12
Carlos Escude, US Political Destabilization and Economic Bovcott of Arqentina durinq the
1940's from Arqentina Between Great Powers. 193946, pp. 63
13
United States trade from Argentina before 1941 had accounted for only 13-15 percent in
comparison to the 40 percent that Great Britain and Germany accounted for when combined. By
the end of 1941, Argentina would rely upon the United States for 36 percent of their foreign trade
and become almost completely reliant upon for industrialgoods. Once Argentina became reliant
upon the United States for both importing and exporting; the United States was able to apply
pressure. This was only possible in areas that the United States, or its allies, was not reliant upon
Argentina for such as linseed and maize.

l0

was no coincidence and it became the second battleground within
Argentina by outside forces.
This time, rather than Germany, England was the opposing interest.
For it was Great Britain's half-hearted support of these measures rather
than Argentine resistance that is usually given credit for the ending of
sanctions by the United States. (While this view is largely agreed upon, the
measures of Argentine political resistance by the various regimes and their
economic success despite the withholding of goods and a policy aimed at
"not permit[-ing] the expansion of Argentine heavy industry" must be taken
into account.l4)
Two schools of thought have developed in regards to Great Britain's

role. One has suggested that Great Britain tried to build upon the success
it had had before the war in order to have it continue through to post war

matters.ls The second is considered more of a reaction to United States
policy, which Great Britain viewed as unnecessary. While Great Britain
would wage a war of influence with the United States, early on in the war
Britain was primarily interested in Argentine beef

Source: Clarance H. Haring, Arqentina and the United States. Boston:World Peace
Foundation, 1941. pP. 46
la Carlos Escude, US Political Destabilization and Economic Bovcott of Aroentina durinq the
1940's from Arqentina Between Great Powers, '1939-46, pp. 64
Ronald C. Newton, Disorderlv Succession: Great Britain. The United States and the'Nazi
Menace' in Aroentina. 1938-1947 from Arqentina Between Great Powers 193946, pp. 1'14.
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At one point Great Britain completed a contract for 1,500,000 tons of

beef. The British were Argentina's biggest buyers of meat during the war
It accounted for 40 percent of the British beef consumption and close to 80

percent of the exported Argentine beef.16 A surprisingly important political
struggle would ensue over the British need for beef.
As the United States began its economic isolation of Argentina, it
knew that it had to have the compliance of its British ally. When
approached with this request the British response was a puzzled, emphatic

no! They were puzzled because unlike their North American ally, they
understood that Argentina's position was not out of the ordinary. ln fact,

Carlos Escude suggests "that the British were actually grateful to Argentina
for her cooperation."lTAfter all, Argentina had sold it the beef it needed on

credit. Another reason for Great Britain's lack of cooperation was the
inability of the United States to meet their beef needs and the British
unwillingness to meet the United States request to switch to pork. The
unreasonable requests by the United States would keep coming
Despite warnings by his staff, as well as the Treasury Department,
Secretary Hull continued to press the British for their cooperation. When

16

Clarance H. Haring, Arqentina and the United States. Boston: World Peace
Foundation, 1941. pp. 36
lTCarlos Escude, US Political Destabilization and Economic Bovcott of Arqentina durino the 1940's
from Arqentina Between Great Powers. 193946, pp. 61
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he did not receive it, he went ahead anyway. Hull believed that Great

Britain, in its weakened state, could not help Argentina that much. lt was a
miscalculation on his part because, aS Randall Woods suggests, "the
British were convinced that the vital force behind America's animosity

toward Argentina was Buenos Aires challenge to U.S. supremacy in the

Western Hemisphere."ls The British also believed that they were "being
asked to help restore Washington's authority in South America, a cause
British diplomats were not at all sure was in their best interest."le British
investment in Argentina before the war had gone unmatched. ln addition to
their concerns about the motivations of the United States, the British felt

that it was at least partially the fault of Hu!! and therefore the United States
that Peron's coup had been successful.
The addition of the British perspective initially seemed to complicate

matters. lnstead, the issues Seem much closer to being resolved. No
matter what the motivation, Great Britain was able to play the role of

spoiler. lf the role of spoiler had not already been filled by Great Britain, it
would have been filled by GermanY.
Nazi propaganda, fascist influence, and the threat of a military "Third
Column" made up of German immigrants were ways that Germany

Woods, Randall B. "Hulland Argentina: Wlsonian Diplomacy in the Age of
Roosevelt." Journal of lnter-American Studies and World Affairs $7a 16(3):350-371
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Ibid.
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disrupted the influence of the United States. The Germans, who really
played less of a role in Argentina than is popularly believed, needed natural
resources as well. ln the process, they were able to create a situation that
forced the United States to intervene
Cereal, an item that Argentina had sold in competition with the
United States before the war, was now a market that they could
monopolize, at least in Germany. German stockpiling soon became a
problem for both Argentina and the Allies. For Argentina, it was a problem
because Germany was selling the goods at an inflated price and in some
cases to "their [Argentina'sl latino vendors".2o lt was a problem for the

Allies because they wanted to cut off supplies to Germany. At one point,
the Allies started buying, just to stop it from getting into the hands of the
Germans.

As if supplying the enemy with food was not enough of a problem for
the United States, Argentina housed a number of German owned
industries. Again, the United States tried to get Argentina to follow its lead
and freeze the German assets. Unlike the United States, Germany allowed
technology and money to flow freely between itself and Argentina creating
a situation the industry-starved Argentina could not replace.

Ronald C. Newton, Disorderly Succession: Great Britain. The United States and the'Nazi
Menace' in Arqentina, 1938-1947 from Arqentina Between Great Powers 1939-46, pp. 123

20

l4

That is really what Argentina's dealings with Germany come down to
They would have been willing to curtail their economic activities with
Germany had the United States been willing to replace them. The United
States, and more importantly, Cordell Hu!! were unwilling to do so, simply
as a matter of principle. He saw this as an issue of Pan-American unity
rather than in the practical terms that seemingly everyone else did.
As with the debate over outside influence, different theories have
explained the reasons behind Argentina's supposed split from Pan-

American Unity. Joseph S. Tulchin suggests that Argentina's "elite
remained convinced that their country was destined for greatness and

would soon overtake the USA in the race for dominance."2l No where is
greater support for Tulchin's findings than in Alberto Conil Pas and
Gustavo Ferrari's book, Argentine Foreign Policv: 1930-1962. ln their book
it is stated that, "on the international scene the Argentine attitude was to be
so distinguished that she would enter into open riva!ry with the United
States for domination in the conduct of the hemisphere."22 This comment,

while supportive of Tulchin's theory, is not reflective of the tone of their

book. Despite the negative light that they portray Argentina in severa! of

21

Joseph S. Tulchin, The Oriqins of Misunderstandinq: United States - Arqentine Relations '190040 from Arqentina Between The Great Powers. 193946, ed. Guido diTella and D. Cameron Watt,
Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990. pp. 35
22
Alberto Conil Paz and Gustavo Ferrari. Arqentina's Foreiqn Policv 1930-1962. Notre Dame,
lndiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966. pp.25
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their referential points are supportive of the need for Argentine
independence in the global community
Tulchin also suggests that frustration at their position would,
"permeate Argentine foreign policy and...cause friction in the relationship
with the USA.'23 His theory is well supported. Argentina's foreign policy
during this period tended to be strong, in terms of maintaining
independence and asserting itself in international issues. This was
exemplified in its rejection of the Monroe Doctrine, its participation in the
League of Nations, and each of the Meetings of the Foreign Ministers.
The debate about the supporting material above continued with shifts
in thought vacillating--from pro-Argentina to pro-interventionist America-as

they do in most historical subjects. ln this case, the historiography does
not clarify the issues. lt is not until inspection of relevant primary sources
that the clarity of Argentina's role becomes evident. Jose Maria Cantilo's
inaugural speech in conjunction with United States Department of State
papers are those primary sources
"American solidarity, gentlemen, is a fact which no one can or does put in
doubt. Each and every one of us is disposed to uphold and to approve this
solidarity in the face of any danger, wherever it may come from, that may
threaten the independence or the sovereignty of any state of this part of the
world. For this we do not need any special pacts. The pact has already been
made by our history. We would act with a single and identical impulse, our
territorial borders wiped out and under a single flag for all-the flag of liberty and
23

Joseph S. Tulchin, The Oriqins of Misunderstandino: United States - Arqentine Relations 190040 ftom Arqentina Between The Great Powers, 193946, ed. Guido diTella and D. Cameron Watt,
Pittsburgh, PA: Universityof Pittsburgh Press, 1990. pp.35
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justice. But Argentina believes that each American people, with its distinctive
character, ought to develop its own policy without forgetting thereby the great
continental solidarity or the natural gravitation of reciprocal interests that are
grouped by reason of geograPhY.
It must be said that our continental solidarity cannot be exclusive of what
unites us to the rest of the human race, and that we cannot be disinterested in
what occurs outside America. Argentina has not done so and will not do so, not
only for reasons in the economic sphere, but also for historical considerations as
well as those of sentimental character."

By 1933, as was mentioned before, Argentina had begun positioning
itself as a power in the Western Hemisphere, if not in the international

community. They had been separating themselves from any attempts by
the United States to break economic ties with Europe because it was not in
their best interest. Argentina saw the creation of a Western geographical
alliance, which was what the United States wanted, as going against its
national identity, which was largely European. The Argentine position of
national interest, as it was reflective of the position of almost every other
powerful country during the war, supported Cantilo's argument
"Just as the United States maintained the Open Door Policy in China,
was moved to interest herself in the Hawaiian lslands, and then after the 1898
war with Spain obtained the cession of the Philippine lslands-a policy that was
not exclusively American-so the interests, and not Argentina'S alone, held by
the River Plate countries in the European markets are in opposition and do carry
weight in their national and international policies. But here economic reasons
are not necessarily of paramount importance in determining the course of
Argentine international policy. We feel a close solidarity with Europe through the
immigration we received so much to our greatness; also to European capitalwe
owe the development of our agricultural production, of our railroads and
industries. Even beyond this, our mind is impregnated with the memory of the
men who had discovered and populated these lands and with the cultural
tradition they had bequeathed to us. From Spain came our race and religion,
while from France, Great Britain, and the United States came the doctrinal
orientation of our democratic institutions. lf to the mother country we owe the
basis of our literature, then to French culture we owe the basic formation of our
intellectual life and to ltaly and Germany all the vital aspects of our evolution.

t7

Hence the predominating influence in our educational system and in our
universities is European. This influence obviously affects the international policy
of Argentina as it does, I am sure, that of all Latin peoples of this continent; in the
same way the interests of the British Empire are cherished and must be
cherished by our brothers in the north."

Drawing a comparison with the United States was another strength
of Cantilo's argument. He was right to do so. After all, both countries had
been isolationist up to this point. Each was trying to assert itself in a way
that they had not done before. lmages of the best of Europe coming

together in a melting pot to create the best of both Old World and New
illustrate Cantilo's American Dream. The gulf between the two American
dreams becomes evident when he invokes the strength of British ties to
North America (U.S.)
"Thus stands determined the attitude which the Argentine delegation is to
adopt in this conference, but nothing of this is to sink us into unilateral and
sectarian exclusivisms. Universalism, the ecumenical spirit, is the tradition in the
country of him who one day in Washington had expounded the motto of
Argentine international policy as "America for Huma nity." "24

ln the fina! portion of Cantilo's speech, his strongest effort was

ignored. ln the face of fascism, he urged the members of the other
American states to avoid absolutism. Such sound advice combined with

Argentina's pragmatic and honest form of neutrality may have kept both
countries out of the war. Nevertheless, the United States in the form of

24

lbid. pp.4446
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Cordell Hull kept pushing harder towards a point that could only include
war
Interpretations of Argentina's role in World War ll have seen no
greater evolution than the country with which it has had the most dynamic
relationship, namely the United States. While many of the broader aspects
of the time such as Axis sympathy and a pro-fascist government still are
considered historically accurate, many of accusations have found
themselves either proved false or revised over the years. No where is this
contrast more evident than in two U.S. State Department documents,
Consultation Among the American Republics Wth Respecf to the
ARGENTINE SITUATION (1946) and U.S. and Allied Wartime and Postwar
Relations and Negotiations with Argentina, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and

Turkey on Looted Gold and German External Assefs and U.S. Concems

About the Fate of the Wartime Ustasha Treasury (1998).
The Consultation Among the American Republics, usually referred to
as the Argentine Blue Book, stands today as a prime example of misguided
U.S. foreign policy. That does not mean that it did not fulfill most of the

goals that it set out. The U.S. presented the Argentine Blue Book to the
Republics of Latin America in 1946. lt was an effort to reveal an Argentina

that had politically, financially, and militarily tried to create "a bloc of South

l9

American states, whose center Argentina should be."25 Had Argentina
been successful it was suggested, a group of "totalitarian individuals and

groups, both military and civilian" would have built "in [the Western]
Hemisphere...a totalitarian state."26 The United States contended that it
was Argentina, not the U.S., who disrupted the Good Neighbor policy,
despite the fact that the Blue Book can only be viewed as an effort of direct
intervention on the part of the United States.
While the Blue Book found success in isolating Argentina from the
rest of Latin America not all of the results were favorable. Current sources
dispute the "successfu!" findings of the Blue Book. Specifically, the current
administration at the United States State Department which says, "U.S

suspicions-[were] never substantiated" and that "the Blue Book gave rise
to considerable anti-American public sentiment, and may have helped to
elect Juan Peron President of Argentina."Z7 These findings truly represent
the greatest shift in thought possible: The United States government finding
itself responsible for events that it blamed on another country. The prudent

25

U.S. Department of State. Consultation Amonq the American Republics Wth Respect to the
ARGENTINE SITUATION. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1946. pp.17
26
Arthur P. \Mitaker, The United States and Arqentina, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1954. pp.2
27

U.S. Department of State. U.S. and Allied Wartime and Postwar Relations and Neqotiations
Wth Arqentina. pp. xxxvi
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warnings of Jose Maria Cantilo's speech joined with the propaganda of the
Blue Book creates a vastly different picture of the roles of both Argentina
and the United States in World War Two

What replaces the images created by a map of South America
written in German and dotted with Nazi flags? What conclusions can be
drawn from the various impressions and interpretations of Argentina's role
in World War Two? (After all, it was the United State, not Argentina that

broke the hemispheric resolve of neutrality with the Lend-Lease Act.)
Argentina was on the verge of a new status within the world
community, of that there is no doubt. Unfortunately, they overestimated
their own global importance. The world powers were not, and some would
argue still are not, ready for Argentina to take a larger role. While that is
clear, there is little agreement as to the specific causation. With the death

of Roosevelt and the retirement of Secretary Hull came the end of the
United States planned destruction of the Argentine economy.2s One can
only hope that its long term effects were not as devastating as they
seemed and that unlike one British perspective, that Argentina's once
bright future is ahead of it and not behind

28

Joseph S. Tulchin, Arqentina and the United States: A Conflicted Relationshio, (Boston:

Twayne Publishers, 1990), pp. 92
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